On the other hand, the degree of KMT political dominance in the aftermath of these elections and the way it has handled demonstrations have led some critics to warn of the dangers of a return to a new authoritarian era. 3 e frequent argument that marks the start of a new era is also reinforced by the warming of cross-Taiwan Strait relations after an e ective political stalemate since . A key task for political analysts is to make complex political processes comprehensible to their readers. One way that we achieve this objective is to classify political eras and examine patterns of change and continuity across time. erefore, in this study I attempt to locate the starting point of Taiwan's new political era. At rst blush, it appears that should be regarded as a turning point, or what political scientists refer to as a "critical election." Critical elections are de ned by Evans and Norris as, " ose exceptional contests which produce abrupt, signi cant and durable realignments in the electorate with major consequences for the long-term party order." 4 Election and survey data are examined to analyze the changing party order in Taiwan. However, here it must be pointed out that the study's results can only be considered preliminary: at least two more electoral cycles are required to determine whether we have witnessed a durable realignment.
is study can only show whether the contest has the potential to be a critical election.
I argue that although does have some of the hallmarks of a watershed year, the data suggest that has a much better claim to be potentially the critical election. e critical shifts in public opinion that laid the foundations for the KMT victories occurred in . Here, the key political developments of are examined to show the role they played in ending the DPP era. Although political pundits tend to regard KMT o cials' visits to the PRC in the spring of as the most momentous political events of that year, I argue that other developments were more signi cant. e KMT's e ective ownership of the anti-corruption issue and the new party leadership both contributed to decisive shifts in party support levels in late .
. In addition, institutional developments that year also make it a turning point. e constitutional reforms of the electoral system-so in uential in giving the KMT overwhelming majorities in -were passed in . In addition, that year KMT primaries began to contribute to a coalescing of Pan Blue parties, as splinter party politicians returned to join the KMT nomination process. 5 is meant that by there was e ectively only a single Pan Blue party, for the rst time since the early s.
C R I T I CA L E L E C T I O N S
Critical elections are actually extremely rare in mature democracies, where continuity, or what political scientists call "maintaining elections," tend to predominate.
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is is where elections essentially re ect a continuation of the status quo in party competition. An intermediate type of election is referred to as a "deviating election." is is where there is a temporary shift in the normal share of votes for the main parties, perhaps through the impact of political scandals, short-term issues, or signi cant events. However, after this short-term deviation, there is a return to the old pattern of party politics in the subsequent election. As Evans and Norris put it, the deviating election is one that leaves "no permanent imprint on the party system." 7 e other major categories of realignment in the party literature attempt to capture the phenomenon of long-term change. Secular dealignment refers to a long-term gradual loosening of voter-party ties. 8 is is closely associated with the "party in crisis" argument that the weakening of the class cleavage in West European democracies has not been replaced by new cleavages that tie social groups to parties. e other long-term change category is known as secular realignment. is describes how party allegiances shift because of generational change or new issue cleavages.
9
. e Pan Blue camp refers to the KMT and its splinter parties, such as the People First Party (PFP) and New Party (NP), while the Pan Green parties are the DPP and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). ese colors are used because blue and green are the main colors of the KMT Although a maintaining election is straightforward to recognize, considerable time is required before we can be certain whether an election is permanently or just temporarily transforming the political system. e concept of critical elections becomes clearer if we think in terms of actual cases in modern democracies. In the case of the U.K., the most frequently cited example of a critical election is New Labour's coming to power in .
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Labour had been in opposition for almost years, losing four consecutive general elections. But under the leadership of Tony Blair, the party recovered and dominated the political scene for well over a decade by winning a series of elections. In fact, until recently it appeared that Labour was likely to be the governing party for the foreseeable future.
C R I T I CA L E L E C T I O N S I N TA I WA N
After two decades of multi-party politics in Taiwan, can we talk of any critical elections there? Each of Taiwan's major elections has had its own unique feature. e contest was the rst multi-party election; 11 and were the rst full parliamentary elections.
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In the NP's strong showing implied the start of a multi-party system; was the rst direct presidential election; and in the DPP's vote and seat share exceeded the KMT's for the rst time. Nevertheless, John Hsieh is correct in his assertion that rather than change, there was far more continuity in the rst era of multiparty elections in Taiwan.
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Unlike most other formerly authoritarian parties after a democratic transition, the KMT was able to remain in power by continuing to win national elections. Now I turn to election and survey data in my search for Taiwan's critical elections. the multiple member district electoral system o ered more space for third parties than did the single-member presidential elections shown in Table . Although in some cases there are disparities in the vote and seat shares that parties received, three contests stand out as potential critical elections: , , and . First, was the rst election in which a third party, the NP, passed the threshold of becoming relevant in both seat and vote shares. is set a pattern in which at least three parties were competing in legislative elections, a pattern that was maintained until . Nevertheless, the weakness of as a critical election lies in the NP's subsequent decline in its second national level election in . us, the success of the NP in the mids can perhaps be seen as a deviating election: by the late s there was a return to two-party competition after the NP bubble burst.
e second potential critical election is . is year was signi cant because of the arrival of two new parties, the TSU and the PFP and the total demise of the NP. is election saw record KMT losses in both seat and vote share, largely in favor of the PFP. In fact, at the time it even looked possible that the PFP might replace the KMT as the largest party in the Pan Blue camp. Moreover, in the DPP became the single largest party for the rst time. e patterns of party competition in were largely maintained three years later in . Nevertheless, the case for -as a critical election is diminished by the transformation in the Taiwanese party system seen in the legislative elections, the rst under the new single-member-district electoral system. 14 First, the KMT recorded its highest ever vote and seat share increases. e seat share changes were especially dramatic as the KMT's total rose from about one-third of the seats in to almost three-quarters of all seats in . e DPP's vote share was relatively stable, but the party su ered its rst and worst ever fall in seat share: from being the largest parliamentary party with almost of the seats, it was relegated to becoming a small-tomedium sized party with just one-quarter of the seats in . e third major shift that year was the virtual disappearance of the challenger parties, making Taiwan a two-party system of one large (KMT) and one small-to-medium party (DPP). In short, these parliamentary results suggest that after a series . In , constitutional revisions were passed that halved the number of legislators from to and moved from a predominantly multiple-member-district system to one of mainly singlemember districts.
of deviating elections, could mark a return to the patterns of party competition last seen at the outset of democratization in the late s. e last set of electoral data examined is for the island-wide single-memberdistrict local executive elections, which is displayed in Table . ese were held for city mayors and county magistrates and took place every four years in the cities and counties (except Taipei and Kaohsiung City). As with the parliamentary statistics, these data suggest that the recent pattern of political competition is returning to a situation rather similar to the early s. After a period of multi-party competition from the mids to , Taiwan was moving back toward a two-party system after . e local executive contest that stands out is -the year that the KMT had its largest increase in seat and vote shares and the DPP its record seat share loss. In fact, the DPP's local executive seat share in was almost exactly the same as its parliamentary seat share, approximately one-quarter of all seats. In other words, set a precedent for a return to KMT one-party dominance, a pattern repeated at the national level in . erefore, this table suggests that the critical election or year marking a watershed between political eras is rather than . In December , the most recent round of local executive elections was held. However, as a result of administrative mergers and upgrading, the elections for a number of key constituencies were postponed until . Nevertheless, these elections did represent the rst island-wide expression of public opinion after the KMT returned to power; they were widely referred to in the media as the "mid-term exam" of President Ma Ying-jeou. 16 Although there was a swing in the vote shares from KMT to DPP, the fact that the KMT won out of districts suggests that the pattern of KMT dominance, set in , has continued. at the KMT would view winning almost three-quarters of available seats and the loss of just one seat as a defeat is reminiscent of its reaction to minor setbacks at the outset of multi-party politics in the late s.
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In other words, although the data are not conclusive, continued KMT dominance does support the argument that can be considered a potential critical election. Examining only election data has its drawbacks when trying to locate watersheds between eras. First, elections are not held every year; thus, key developments between elections may be missed. Second, elections held at di erent levels and under di erent electoral systems cannot be easily compared. erefore, I also look at developments in party identi cation surveys, shown in Table , which are conducted more frequently. ese show some similarity to the election data. For instance, there was a shift toward a multiparty system with the arrival of the NP in the mids. As with the election data, seems to mark the start of a new era, with a halving of the number of KMT supporters and the transfer of their support to the PFP. e danger that the KMT would be replaced as the dominant Pan Blue party can be seen from the fact that in and , the PFP's support levels were actually higher than the KMT's. On the other hand, change for the DPP occurred more within the pattern of secular realignment, with a very steady year-on-year increase in its support levels from just in to a high of . in .
. Nevertheless, as in the local executive elections, the year that stands out in the party identi cation surveys as a watershed is . is year saw the biggest single year-on-year rise in party identi cation for the KMT, from . to . . Although the decline in PFP support contributed to this rise, it is likely that some independents (i.e., non-partisans) also shifted allegiance to the KMT. is year was also important because it represents the rst signi cant fall in support for the DPP from to . Although most of these former DPP supporters would likely have become independents, it is at least possible that some may have crossed the divide and become KMT identi ers.
e importance of is also reinforced by the fact that it was followed for the next four years by relative consistency in party support levels. Surprisingly, it appears that dramatic events such as the Red Shirts Anti-Corruption Movement of , the DPP's more radical nationalist appeals in the last two years of the Chen Shui-bian administration, and even the KMT's landslide victories and return to power in all had relatively minimal longterm impacts on party support levels.
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In short, the survey data also support the case for being a potential critical election year.
E X P L A I N I N G T H E 2 0 0 5 C R I T I CA L S H I F T I N P U B L I C O P I N I O N
If we accept that the roots of the landslides lie in the political developments of , then the next step is to try to unravel what contributed to this critical shift in public opinion. erefore, I next review some of the key potential developments in that could help explain this shift. Because political scientists working on Taiwan mainly concentrate on issues related to national identity/cross-strait relations, this seems to be the rst eld to consider.
e political event that captured the most media attention in was of course the April visit by KMT Chairman Lien Chan to China, where for the rst time since the s, party-to-party talks were conducted between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). ese talks saw a range of . e Red Shirts Anti-Corruption campaign was a large social movement that emerged in the autumn of calling on Chen Shui-bian to resign the presidency. In the last two years of Chen's second term, the DPP increasingly courted its core supporters with Taiwanese nationalist appeals. For instance, it scrapped the National Uni cation Guidelines in and renamed the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall as the Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall in .
agreements signed by KMT and CCP leaders. Also agreed was a framework for future consultation and meetings that have continued to the present, even after the KMT became the ruling party. ere is no doubt that these talks did help to ease cross-strait tensions and laid the foundation for the de facto government-to-government talks held since Ma Ying-jeou came to power in . Previously, there was concern that voters would react negatively to party-to-party talks and condemn the KMT as being uni cationist or defeatist. Nevertheless, what was surprising was that the talks were relatively well received by Taiwanese public opinion, with over of respondents judging the visit a success and helpful for cross-strait relations.
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Although there is a correlation between the new détente with the CCP and the KMT's growing popularity, there is no clear evidence that this in uenced the public opinion shifts of . e DPP did try to condemn the KMT as defeatist in , but such issues were not salient in the local executive election campaign, which was dominated by corruption scandals. Moreover, we should recall that the agreements were signed by Lien at the end of his term as KMT chair; subsequently, although the agreements were not scrapped, Ma, the new KMT leader, kept a degree of distance from the KMT-CCP forum. For instance, he did not repeat Lien's comments on allying with the CCP against Taiwan independence; nor did Ma visit China under the title of KMT chairman during his two years in that role.
We can also con rm the lack of a clear relationship between the KMT's China visits and the shift in public opinion, by examining party identi cation polls conducted between and . He goes on to claim that mainland policy was a major issue in the elections and that "voters opted for cross-Strait stability" of the KMT rather than the DPP's extremism. is does seem to have some resonance when we consider portions of the rhetoric of Chen Shui-bian and his ministers in their second term. e rst problem with this argument is that the DPP only really went to extremes in the last two years of its term, and . For instance, the move to scrap the National Uni cation Guidelines and National Unication Council occurred in and the anti-Chiang Kai-shek appeals, along with the policy of renaming state-owned enterprises to use the term "Taiwan," were in .
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We need to remember that the major shift in public opinion occurred in . In that year, the DPP actually took a rather moderate stance on national identity issues. For instance, in February, President Chen and Pan Blue leader Soong Chu-yu signed a joint -point agreement that included support for the Republic of China.
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Moreover, an analysis of both main parties' election advertising in shows issues related to Taiwan independence or identity received minimal attention.
. Robert Ross, "Taiwan's Fading Independence Movement," Foreign A airs : (March-April ), pp. -, .
. In its last two years, the DPP administration actively tried to rename state-owned enterprises. 
THE POLITICAL CORRU PTION ISSU E AND THE MA YING-JEOU FACTOR
e evidence that the political corruption issue played a more signi cant role in the public opinion shifts of late is far more convincing than explanations focusing on cross-strait relations or national identity. Political corruption has been one of the most salient issues in Taiwanese politics since the early s. It was critical in the DPP's expansion of its support base and in eroding KMT support in the s.
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Voters had traditionally associated political corruption with the KMT, and critiquing such behavior had long been a key weapon for Taiwan's opposition parties, including the DPP and the NP. Even after the DPP became the ruling party, it still owned the clean government issue and continued to employ it against the KMT.
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Although the KMT, after it lost power in , began to place more emphasis on attacking the DPP for corruption, these appeals had limited e ect prior to because the DPP still maintained a relatively clean image compared to the KMT. For instance, in the presidential campaign Chen came under attack for receiving illegal donations, but these attacks appeared to have little impact on the election result. 26 e degree to which the DPP still owned the anti-corruption issue can be seen in Table , which shows the proportion of voters that viewed the parties as free of corruption between and . e table shows that until mid-, voters still tended to view the KMT as being more corrupt than the DPP. e major shift in party image on the corruption issue occurred in late : within a few months, the proportion of voters viewing the DPP as being free from corruption declined from to , while those viewing the KMT as clean rose from to . Moreover, the timing of this shift in party image corresponds exactly with the shift in party support levels in late . is can be explained by the string of corruption scandals that emerged in late and dominated the agenda throughout the nal months of the campaign. e allegations that were particularly damaging for the DPP were related to corruption in the Kaohsiung Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) construction project and also to high-level DPP involvement in stock market insider trading. 27 e former deputy secretary-general of the Presidential O ce, Chen Che-nan, was the focus of the Kaohsiung MRT scandal, and so this indirectly implicated President Chen. Chen Che-nan had proclaimed his innocence, but pictures of him and the former head of Kaohsiung Rapid Transit Corporation in a casino in South Korea were used by the KMT as ammunition against the DPP.
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Although Chen Che-nan was expelled from the DPP, the scandal seriously tarnished the image of the party.
After the defeat, DPP legislator Lin Cho-shui explained, "In this election, for every county and city candidate it was a battle between Chen Che-nan and Ma Ying-jeou." 29 e KMT revealed its emphasis on anti-corruption in its advertising and campaign rallies, where it was the dominant issue. For instance, the party's main pre-election rally was called the "Oppose Corruption Save Taiwan, All People Rally." 30 is was in stark contrast to many previous Of course, the anti-corruption issue could only bene t the KMT if it improved its own reputation. At the time the KMT lost power in , only of respondents saw it as a clean party, compared to for the DPP. Nevertheless, Table shows that between and , the KMT's reputation gradually improved. It was only in late that-for the rst timethe KMT had a cleaner reputation than the DPP; it has maintained this advantage up to the present writing. e KMT was able to improve its image despite the fact that the DPP tried to use the corruption issue throughout this period.
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Moreover, there is no evidence that KMT local executives were any less corrupt than their DPP counterparts: candidates from both parties had pending corruption cases. Instead, it was the parties' contrasting national-level image of corruption that would override local party or candidate images.
How was the KMT able to transform its image? Four key factors contributed to this development. First, with most local executive positions and the national government in DPP hands, there was far less scope for the KMT to indulge in or be accused of corruption. By , memories of the KMT's numerous corruption scandals of the s had faded signi cantly. Second, since the KMT partly attributed its poor reputation to its fall from power in , o cials undertook some organizational reforms to try to erase the party's corrupt image. In particular, they reformed nomination regulations to avoid nominating tainted candidates.
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A third major factor was the election of Ma Ying-jeou as KMT party chairman in July . Ma was one of the few KMT politicians seen as corruption free, a reputation he initially cultivated by cracking down on KMT vote buying when he was minister of justice in the early-to-mids. In , as in , with Ma fronting the party, accusations of KMT corruption were less e ective. Ma's election as KMT chair in the summer of was a key moment in the party's revival. When we are considering the shift of public opinion in in favor of the KMT, we must also stress the importance of Ma's popularity. Ma was able to appeal to core Pan Blue voters but also to the many non-aligned independent voters. Surveys of public satisfaction with Taiwan's leading politicians during the DPP era show that Ma was consistently by far the most popular politician.
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For instance, in a public satisfaction survey in December , Ma had a satisfaction level of , with his nearest rival almost lower at and Chen at an all-time low of only of voters.
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Ma also had political communication skills far superior to his predecessor, Lien Chan. Although this was particularly evident in his campaigning in the run-up to the elections, Ma did invigorate the campaign. He campaigned throughout the island for KMT candidates. At times the KMT tried to frame the election as a referendum on Ma's leadership. For instance, on the eve of the election, Ma threatened to resign his chairmanship if the party failed to win half the seats. One half-page KMT newspaper advertisement showed a solemn Ma and the slogan: "Don't let Ma Ying-jeou disappear from political circles." 37 Undoubtedly, being led by Taiwan's most popular politician helped invigorate the KMT base and also appealed to critical swing voters, who would determine the national-level election in .
. TVBS Poll Center, "Sanheyi Xuanju hou Guonei Jiuda Zhengzhi Renwu Shengwang Diaocha" [Survey on the popularity of the nation's nine main politicians after the three in 
I N S T I T U T I O NA L VA R I A B L E S I N 2 0 0 5
When we look for answers to why the KMT won in , changes in public opinion can only tell us part of the story. ere are also institutional variables that can support the contention that was the critical turning point. First, in the KMT's primary elections began to contribute toward a Pan Blue merger. Since the early s, the Pan Blue camp had suffered from severe divisions, both via rebel KMT candidates such as Soong Chu-yu in , and through splinter parties that split the KMT vote, such as the NP and PFP. 38 A key factor in the divided Pan Blue camp was its use of authoritarian nomination methods in the s. e KMT returned to using primaries in , which reduced the number of rebel candidates signi cantly. However, in a new precedent for Pan Blue unity was set in the primaries for Taipei County, whereby a number of PFP politicians returned to the KMT to join its primary process. e eventual winner was one of these former PFP politicians who then went on to win the Taipei County seat, a district that the DPP had held since . is kind of Pan Blue primary was held on a far greater scale in the run-up to the elections, so that on the eve of the election there was e ectively only a single Pan Blue Party, the KMT. e second key institutional reason for viewing as a critical year was the constitutional reform of the electoral system that was passed that year.
is meant that, as noted previously, the number of legislators was halved from to ; the former single vote multiple member district system was replaced with a single member district two-vote system. 39 ese changes only came into e ect for the legislative elections, but looking at Tables and above we can see how the new system was disastrous for all parties except the KMT. e KMT did increase its vote share from . to . , but its seat share doubled from . to almost three-quarters of the seats. In contrast, the DPP's vote share actually rose slightly from . to . , but its . e way rebel candidates and splinter parties split the Pan Blue vote and led to defeat is evident in Tables -above. For instance, Soong's candidacy in meant that although the combined Pan Blue vote was almost , the DPP's Chen Shui-bian won with . . Under the Legislative Yuan electoral system prior to , voters cast one vote for a candidate in multiple member districts. After , voters cast two votes, one for a candidate in a single member district and one for their preferred party. ere are single member districts, six aboriginal seats, and seats given to parties according to the proportion of votes received on the second ballot.
seat share plummeted from being the largest party, with .
of seats to only . In other words, the system moved from being highly proportional to one that not only o ered no space for small parties but was highly disproportional and clearly favored one party.
Two examples can illustrate how the KMT bene ted under the new system. First, certain KMT strongholds with small voter constituencies retained their seats relatively unchanged. For instance, the o shore islands, Taitung in the southeast, and aboriginal districts have always been dominated by Pan Blue parties, but these districts were not a ected by the reforms. 40 e KMT candidate won in Lienchiang with just , votes, while in other districts , votes were required to win election. is meant that the KMT in e ect had a -seat head start.
A second case that illustrates the impact of the new system and changed political environment is Yilan County in northeastern Taiwan. In , this was a three-seat district in which the DPP won two seats and, as a result of a Pan Blue splinter party candidate, the KMT won just one. Under the new electoral system, Yilan became a one-seat constituency. e Pan Blue party merger since and shift in party support levels meant that the KMT was able to win this single seat in , and the DPP candidate lost despite receiving over , votes. Perhaps the greatest mistake of the DPP during the Chen era was promoting this constitutional reform. Although some DPP gures such as Lin Cho-shui had warned that this would be disastrous, Chen was convinced by his presidential victory in that the DPP could win a majority under the new system. 41 Instead, the new system appears to make long-term KMT parliamentary majorities more likely.
C O N C L U S I O N S
is essay has applied the concept of critical elections to Taiwan's recent political history. It has shown that there is more evidence to suggest that , rather than , should be regarded as the watershed or potential critical election. at year saw the decisive shift in public opinion away from . Districts like Lienchiang, Taitung, Penghu, and Jinmen remained unchanged, while the aboriginal districts only dropped from eight seats to six. In legislative elections since , the DPP had only ever held one seat out of these districts, an aboriginal seat in . . Lin Wei-ren, "Xuanzheng Jiagou yu Guohui Xinmao" [Election structure and the new face of Parliament], Lianhebao, May , , p. A .
the DPP toward the KMT. It also saw important institutional developments such as reforms to Taiwan's electoral system and KMT primaries that facilitated a merger of Pan Blue parties. e fact that public opinion since has been stable and subsequent electoral results have followed the pattern set at that time together highlight the long-term signi cance of that year. Similarly, the reforms of the electoral system look likely to continue aiding the KMT in future parliamentary contests. Naturally, it is too early to reach a de nite conclusion as to whether was a critical election: that verdict will require at least two more electoral cycles. For the time being, it can only remain a potential critical election.
